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Abstract
In this paper we aim at a generic methodology to validate, assess, and construct
mobile multi-agent systems in the domain of virtual market places. It rests upon
research carried out in the past to develop innovative engineering solutions for ar-
chitectures based on the paradigm of mobile multi-agents. This methodology will
cover requirement analysis including imposed security issues, system design, and
implementation of such systems. Virtual market places of diﬀerent types will serve
as application scenarios, where security issues are addressed in all phases of the
development process.
Rather than treating the various technical aspects in isolation, we want to in-
tegrate research and development on economic models of market places, (formal)
security requirements, functional architectures of (mobile) agents and societies of
agents, security functions, and the implementation of the architectural design and
abstract security solutions on existing platforms.
c©2002 Published by Elsevier Science B. V.
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Although commenced by looking at concrete (market place) scenarios, the ulti-
mate goal is to come up with a generic methodology that provides analytic tech-
niques, techniques for (formal) descriptions, and design patterns that are useful for
a large variety of (market place) scenarios and other application areas.
1 Project Goals
The success of the Internet and the World Wide Web (WWW) has deeply in-
ﬂuenced our every day lives as well as our business and commercial structure.
Forrester Research estimates that Internet-based business-to-business trans-
actions will grow from 8 billion dollars in 1999 to at least 327 billion dollars
in 2002.
Agent technologies and multiagent systems will play a major part in the
further development of WWW-based applications: virtual market places with
customer agents and seller agents, chat rooms and avatars, personal assistant
agents as well as non-benevolent agents designed to attack a site, are just some
of the many applications.
Successful attacks, most recently for example the intrusion into the local
network of Microsoft, demonstrate the danger globally operating companies
face. Also the danger of intrusion into military head quarters is well-known.
Forrester Research reports that despite an expected 300 percent increase in
spending on information technology security over the next four years, U.S.
companies will still be left almost as vulnerable to security breaches as they
are today. Agent technologies increase the possibilities of malicious practice:
e.g it is technological feasible to design a swarm of attack agents, which is able
to reproduce itself on any server it gets access to, and which can carry viruses
or Trojan Horses, or just extract classiﬁed information.
Research in security has been focused on the solutions of individual security
problems. For example, various solutions have been proposed to deﬁne and
verify secure key-exchange protocols or to translate a given trust model into
a formal security policy. However, only little research has been carried out to
integrate these individual techniques into a global security methodology for
basic agent technologies and multiagent systems.
In this paper we investigate fundamental security threats in the design
of multiagent systems within virtual market places. These threats can be
classiﬁed whether they are: (i) inherent to the application scenario to be
implemented, (ii) inherent in the multiagent system level design, or (iii) a
consequence of the design of an individual agent, or (iv) a result of using
mobile computing. We therefore investigate into how the design of the ap-
plication, the design of the agent society (as well as the individual agents),
and the selection of the computation paradigm inﬂuences the characteristics
of the security threats and how security measures can be combined to an all-
embracing security infrastructure. As a result, we aim at providing a speciﬁc
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methodology that uses the multiagent system paradigm to realize secure ap-
plications. Accordingly, this methodology (and the project work) is organized
around three levels: the application architecture, the system architecture, and
the computational architecture.
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Fig. 1. Layers of Security
We use concrete instances of virtual market places to illustrate our ap-
proach. This application domain is interesting for multiagent system research
in its own right. However, our multiagent system research will concentrate on
a compositional design methodology for multiagent system to investigate how
top-down requirements and bottom-up behavior of multiagent system can be
brought together.
2 Motivating Example
SEMAS will investigate several settings for virtual market places, i.e. markets
based on auctions and free negotiation. In the following we use the model of
a virtual mall to illustrate the research topics that are relevant for SEMAS in
the context of two concrete example scenarios as shown in Figure 2.
These scenarios, mobile comparison shopping and an auction house at a
virtual mall, will serve as use cases for the research and development of the
SEMAS methodology. Both scenarios, and their corresponding security issues,
are described in more detail in the following sections.
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2.1 Virtual Mall: Mobile Comparison Shopping
This scenario deals with integrative negotiation in the course of mobile com-
parison shopping agent within a virtual mall. A mobile customer agent ﬁrst
contacts a matchmaker agent and, based on the result, then visits selected
merchants’ sites within the mall that can potentially contribute to its search
for the best price and other relevant attributes for the desired product the user
wants to purchase. For this purpose, the agent negotiates with the merchant
agents based on multi-attribute theory [10].
The multi-attribute theory provides a way of representing and calculat-
ing the utilities of outcomes of actions by decomposing them into utilities of
the value-relevant factors that make up the outcomes of recommendation ac-
tions. Recommendation is determined by defeasible decision making on the
basis of the values assigned to diﬀerent factors and the magnitude of these
values, respectively. In addition, this theory oﬀers methods for composing
utility measures and the construction of libraries of standard forms for utility
functions.
The customer agent recommends product items to the user based on an
evaluation of multiple attributes such as price and quality of the desired prod-
ucts, delivery times and costs, return policies, promotions and gift services
as well as customer support and reputation of respective merchants. The
underlying negotiation between user and merchant agents analyzes the deci-
sion problem of what and who to buy from in terms of transaction, or more
qualitatively, through attribute constraints. It solves this decision problem by
applying ﬁnite-domain constraint satisfaction techniques [18].
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Fig. 3. Diﬀerent Kinds of Electronic Market Places
A portal makes it easier for the customer to deal with large malls as only
one address and corresponding public key has to be known. Empowered by
the matchmaker agent service of the portal site, the mobile customer agent
visits merchants within the mall that can contribute without the necessity for
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the user to be connected to the mall at all times. It returns with the result
when the user is online again. Since the user trusts his mobile agent it does
not need to interact with the user during the negotiations and visits.
Like intermediaries in the physical economy, intelligent middle-agents such
as matchmaker and broker agents can be considered as electronic intermedi-
aries in the digital economy [1]. These agents provide means for coordinat-
ing activities among agent providers and requesters of services (information,
goods, or expertise) in the Internet [3]. Their main task is to locate and
connect the ultimate service providers with the ultimate requesters in open
environments, that is to appropriately cope with the connection problem.
The purpose of the mall is to let agents travel from server to server while
collecting intermediate results. Although all the nodes are known beforehand,
the agent is free to decide how many nodes in the mall to visit, and in what
order. This means that at any place the agent can determine, based on its
current state, its next hop or hops. The intermediate results are the oﬀers of
the selected merchants that are returned to the agent. The agent evaluates
these oﬀers concurrently and decides at the end of the visits with whom to
make the deal.
2.1.1 Security Issues of Mobile Comparison Shopping
For the comparison shopping scenario outlined above we shall now describe
the security engineering aspects of the SEMAS approach in somewhat more
detail. For each of the (abstraction) levels we indicate the relevant security
issues, modeling techniques, and design steps.
At the global level of the application architecture, the basic organization
of the market place scenario is deﬁned without looking at speciﬁc technical
solutions at this point of time. In the corresponding phase of security engineer-
ing a global security policy is developed by identifying threats and deﬁning
security objectives to counteract these threats. In a rigorous approach both,
the abstract application architecture and the desired security objectives have
to be formalized. The formalization of the Digital Signature Scenario, which
was done as part of the VSE-II project, is an example of a “formal security
policy”. The main challenge comes from formalizing security objectives at this
abstract level.
Since the application architecture will be deﬁned without referring to con-
cepts of a particular technology, such as special agent architectures, we will
use the general terminology for the assessment of IT-technology, like the Infor-
mation Technology Security Evluation Criteria ITSEC, [14], and the Common
Criteria, CC, [6] as a starting point. Where necessary these concepts will be
reﬁned or extended 1 . Risk analysis in this setting proceeds by identifying sub-
jects acting in certain roles and classes of objects owned (used, manipulated)
1 This may be necessary, as the prevailing terminology of these criteria stems from the
(security) analysis of operating systems
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or exchanged by these subjects. Depending on the particular application,
subjects can be persons, organizations, and computer processes. Of course,
in our context subjects will most often be realized by agents. In the com-
parison shopping scenario, for instance, the most important roles are that of
merchants, customers, and matchmakers. Classes of objects include products,
oﬀers, orders, or agents.
A separation of concerns is provided by a classiﬁcation of security issues.
In our scenario one could distinguish between trust, confidentiality, integrity,
non-repudiation, and anonymity. This classiﬁcation supports a rigorous anal-
ysis and is useful for subsequent technical solutions. For example, it seems
to be necessary that one distinguishes between the conﬁdentiality of messages
exchanged between subjects and the trust that the recipient will handle the
information according to certain rules. On the other hand there might be po-
tentially conﬂicting issues such as the necessity to obtain trust in (the behavior
of) certain subjects and the request for anonymity of these subjects.
In certain situations it is necessary that a subject can trust another subject
with respect to certain aspects of its behavior. This holds in particular for
electronic marketplaces as constituents of the Internet economy. As mentioned
above, middle-agents may act as intermediaries on such marektplaces. It
is an essential requirement of any middle-agent to behave in a trustworthy
manner to its clients [20,13]. In this sense, a middle-agent acts as a trusted
intermediary among the agents of the considered agent society according to
given trust policies of individual agents and the whole society.
Both internal data and the computational processes of mediation executed
by the middle-agent should be robust against external manipulation or attacks
of malicious agents, systems, or users. On the other hand, clients of a middle-
agent should have no incentive to misuse any information which has been
revealed by the middle-agent during mediation. In this respect most common
trust actions are authorization and veriﬁcation of credentials of all parties
which are involved in the mediation.
Actions have to take diﬀerent trust relationships into account which may
exist among the customer agents, middle-agents, and the provider or merchant
agents within one or more connected agent societies. Can a contacted middle-
agent, for example, be trusted by its clients to not resell (parts of) private
proﬁle information, copyrighted data, and so forth, to other middle-agents or
clients it collaborates with? Does it also hold across multiagent systems bor-
ders? Customer agents also might want to verify certain facts about relevant
merchant agents before contracting them.
In summary, there is an obvious need for all agents involved in the me-
diation process to use an appropriate trust model to analyze and assess the
risks of and methods to prevent and counteract attacks against their data and
knowledge. Models, methods and techniques supporting the establishment
and management of mutual trust between a middle-agent and its clients in an
open environment include:
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• the use of expressive trust establishment certiﬁcates useful for, e.g., binding
agent identity to public key infrastructures such as IETF’s SPKI [5,17], and
other standard security mechanisms and protocols, the use of mechanisms
to bind agent names to their human deployers, so that the human would
bear responsibility in case his/her agent misbehaves.
• the formal speciﬁcation of agent trust policies, and
• the respective update, propagation, and transitive merge of trust matrices
to calculate an overall trust relationship that accounts for the trust values
in each and every individual trust relationship which is relevant to the medi-
ation process [12]. An option is the application of distributed history-based
reputation mechanisms to agent societies [21].
In the context of a virtual mall the following issues of trust may be identi-
ﬁed. The customer has to be sure that the subject she addresses as a match-
maker really represents the virtual mall she wants to visit. Moreover, the
customer will expect from the matchmaker that it provides her with an ex-
haustive collection of merchant’s locations, that are relevant for her search and
she can trust in, and that the matchmaker handles the information given to it
by the customer according to certain rules. Vice versa, the matchmaker has
to identify the subject, addressing it as an approved customer which among
other criteria has to be examined according to her credit standing. Note that
this does not necessarily mean that the matchmaker has to know about the
ﬁnal identity of the customer.
Confidentiality means that unauthorized subjects should not be able to
gain knowledge about messages (objects) exchanged between other subjects
or data owned by other subjects. In a scenario such as this, one has to ﬁx
rules with respect to the right to know certain information or, on the contrary,
with respect to keep information secret. In our example scenario the oﬀers
made by a particular merchant to a customer should not become known to
other merchants and customers. This also holds for third parties that are part
of the virtual mall and for subjects outside that are able to perceive the com-
munication process going on. In contrast to this, it is a matter of trust how
information is treated by authorized subjects. There are various formal ap-
proaches to model conﬁdentiality. In interference/noninterference techniques
as they have been used, for example, in the VSE security models for chip
cards, there is a distinction between allowed/disallowed ﬂow of information.
The FM-DIN security model, [11], used an explicit theory of knowledge (acqui-
sition). Saying that an oﬀer should not be compromised does not simply mean
that the data object sent to the customer should not become known to some
“attacker”. Rather, it should be impossible to derive the price mentioned in
the oﬀer from the information accessible to an “attacker”.
Unauthorized subjects should not be able to manipulate objects exchanged
or owned by other subjects thereby violating their integrity. For example,
merchants should not be able to manipulate the oﬀers collected by a customer
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moving around in the mall. As in the case of conﬁdentiality, allowed and dis-
allowed changes have to be modeled in an appropriate way. While a customer
might be given the right to look at the recommendations given by the match-
maker to another customer it should be impossible for him to manipulate this
information. Techniques to formalize integrity are often similar to those used
for conﬁdentiality.
At least in some situations it should by impossible for a subject to reveal
the identity of another subject. So (perhaps) a customer should be able to walk
around in the mall and collect oﬀers without being identiﬁed. Nevertheless,
the matchmaker has to be able to check whether the customer is allowed to
visit the mall. As opposed to conﬁdentiality, anonymity does not deal with
the content data objects but with the source of a communication, although
at a more technical level information about the source and destination of a
message can be part of the message itself. Note that anonymity does not mean
that the identity of a subject is hidden to all other subjects for all time. So
for example, there will be a trusted authority that knows about the identity
of all customers. Moreover, it seems sensible that in later stages the identity
of a customer becomes known to a particular merchant.
Non-repudiation is concerned with the legal relevance of communications.
To make a merchants oﬀer binding the customer has to be in a position where
he can prove that the message (containing the oﬀer) was willingly sent by the
merchant.
The system design process starts with a description of technical solutions
at an abstract level. In our case this means that the virtual mall scenario
is mapped to a software architecture. Without going into the details of an
eﬃcient implementation (programming languages, platforms, communication)
the basic algorithms determining the behavior of agents making up the virtual
mall scenario are designed and speciﬁed. This includes those parts that are
critical with respect to the security issues identiﬁed in the ﬁrst phase.
The abstract security policy has to be realized by what is sometimes called
security functions and mechanisms. For our scenario the following functions
are relevant:
• Trust can be realized by certiﬁcates.
• Conﬁdentiality can be achieved by access control and encryption.
• Integrity can be achieved by access control and can be checked by using
hash-functions.
• Anonymity can be achieved by using certiﬁed pseudonyms.
• Non-repudiability can be achieved by using digital signatures.
2.2 Virtual Mall: Mobile Customer Agents and Auctions
This scenario concerns participation of mobile customer agents in one or more
auctions at one or more auction houses in a virtual mall. Each auction house is
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owned by one or more merchants in the mall and may run one or more auctions
for a given type of commodity or task, that is a set of items each of which
multiple customers can concurrently bid for. As in the mobile comparison
shopping scenario a mobile customer agent ﬁrst contacts a matchmaker agent
at the portal site of the virtual mall to obtain information on the relevant
auctions and auction houses in the mall. Based on these recommendations
the agent moves to selected relevant auction servers sequentially to participate
in respective auctions. It may also reside on a safe server near by an auction
house to track ongoing auctions. Before we discuss the beneﬁts of using mobile
agents on auctions and their security issues, let us brieﬂy recall the notion of
an auction.
Auction theory [19] analyzes protocols and agents’ strategies in auctions.
An auction is a price-ﬁxing mechanism of an auction house in which negotia-
tion is subject to a very strict coordination process. It consists of an auctioneer
who wants to mediate the exchange of given items between buyers and ven-
dors for sale at the highest possible price, and potential bidders who want to
buy them at a lowest possible price. Asynchronous bidding mechanisms are
mostly based on open-outcry with price changes or sealed bids with periodic
partial revelation. Any auction is a sequence of auction rounds and concerns
auctioning of goods or tasks. The private value of an item depends only on the
agent’s own preferences; its common value corresponds to the agent’s value of
the item determined by others’ values; its correlated value depends partly on
the agent’s own preferences and partly on others’ values for it.
Online auctions appear to be unnecessarily hostile to customers due to the
winner’s curse and oﬀer no long-term beneﬁts to merchants. If bidders have
reasonable information about the worth of the item, then the average of all
the guesses is likely to be correct. However, the winner oﬀers the bid furthest
from the actual value, thus, pays more for the item than its value, so any
auction is basically a win-lose game.
Any auction may be classiﬁed along three dimensions of (1) bidding rules
including, for example, bid format, and many-to-one or many-to-many par-
ticipation, (2) clearing policy such as pricing, clear schedule and closing, and
(3) information revelation policy including, for example, price quotes, quote
schedule, etc.
Prominent protocols for auctions we will consider in the scenario include
the
• ﬁrst-price, open-cry, so-called English auction. The bidders successively
raise a bid for an item until one bidder remains. The winner is the last
bidder remaining at the price of the second-highest bidder. The dominant
strategy for consumers here is to bid up to their true (private), maximum
value, then drop out.
• descending price, open-cry, so-called Dutch auction that guarantees the auc-
tioneer the purchase of items at highest possible price. The rules are that
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the auctioneer calls out a descending price for an item and the bidder call
out a bid. The winner is the ﬁrst bidder to call out at a price bid. Optimal
strategy is to bid just below private value of item.
• ﬁrst-price, sealed-bid auction where each bidder submits one bid in igno-
rance of all other bids. The highest bidder wins and pays the amount he
bids. This has the potential to force buyers and seller into price wars since
the sealed bid of any bidder depend on what s/he believes of all other op-
ponents bids.
• second-price, sealed-bid, so-called Vickrey auction where the winning bidder
pays the price of only the second highest bid [16].
Under the assumption of subjective private value, all four basic auction
types listed above can be shown to yield the same expected price and revenue
to the seller when bidders are not risk-averse but risk neutral and symmetric
(means they use the same measurements to estimate their valuations). This
implies that the auction choice is not as crucial because each format yields on
average the same payoﬀ. But revenue equivalence does not hold true under
common value assumption (when bidders have similar evaluations). Auction
types for multiple (identical or heterogeneous) items for sale are, for example,
the discriminatory, the double, and the matrix auction. Further auction-based
mechanisms are discussed in, for example, [4].
What are the main beneﬁts for customers of using mobile agents to par-
ticipate in auctions in a virtual mall? Mobile customer agents roaming the
network of the virtual mall may monitor events and track bids in multiple auc-
tions to help their customers for conditioned bidding in time and best deals.
The beneﬁts of using mobile agents which move near or on the auction house
server include, amongst others,
• avoidance of network lag to get information and bid more timely,
• continuation of bidding even when the user is temporarily disconnected, and
• avoidance of large sizes and frequent downloading of information, thereby
saving bandwidth and time for bidding decisions.
2.2.1 Security Issues of Mobile Agents on Auctions
The security issues of trust, conﬁdentiality, and integrity in this scenario are
closely related to the types of threats to auctions of any of the types men-
tioned above. These include, amongst others, vulnerability of auctions to (1)
bidder collusions, (2) shills, (3) lying auctioneers, and (4) undesirable private
information revelation.
A serious threat to auctioning from the customers’ perspective concerns
so-called shills, which means that special agents are planted by the auctioneer
to manipulate the valuation of the auctioned good by raising bids to stimulate
the market. However, shills are only a problem in non-private value settings
for English and all-pay auctions. Vickrey, ﬁrst-price sealed-bid, and Dutch
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auctions are not vulnerable to this threat. In general, classic analysis of auc-
tions ignore the possibility of shills violating the trust in auctioneers and the
integrity of oﬀers.
The same goes with lying auctioneers. For example, in Vickrey auctions,
a lying auctioneer can overstate the second highest bid to the winning bidder
in order to increase its own revenue. This implies the need of bid veriﬁcation
mechanisms, e.g. via cryptographic signatures. Another possibility would be
the use of third-party auction bots which will reveal the (real) highest bid to
the seller after closing of the auction. In public auctions auctioneers have no
incentives to lie to the bidders. However, the auctioneer might try to refuse
to sell after the auction has ended.
Another threat concerns conﬁdentiality violated via undesirable revelation
of private information by both the auctioneer or customer agents. There are
observable problems with subcontractors of bidders whose strategic marginal
cost information is revealed in Vickrey and English auction since truthful bid-
ding is a dominant strategy in such types of auctions. In general, bidding is
often the result of correct predictions about the behavior of others and some-
times that means guessing the extent of someone else’s information correctly.
A mobile customer agent may attack other competing customer agents to
gather such information concurrently to support the bidding of its customer.
On the other hand an auctioneer could sell or reveal private information on
bids and preferences of past and current bidders to competing agents for mis-
use.
Regarding all of the above types of threats the main security issues for
mobile customer agents are trust in, and integrity of, the auction house as
well as conﬁdentiality of both, auction house and customer agents.
From the perspective of an auction house a diﬀerent threat concerns coali-
tion formation among customer agents during an auction which agree to not
outbid one another but distribute the purchased items among themselves pri-
vately. This is an issue of trust of an auctioneer in the customer agents which
are currently participating in the auction. Both issues, shills and bidder collu-
sions or coalitions on auctions are considered illegal but hard to detect; thus,
mechanisms to reduce the agents’ incentive for both types of actions a-priori
have to be embedded into the negotiation protocol explicitly or indirectly as
part of the protocol’s theoretical features. Please note that the formation
of coalitions among mobile customer agents in a virtual mall is not prohib-
ited: a coalition as a whole is allowed to participate in an auction where a
representative is chosen as the bidder.
3 A Methodology
We aim at the development of innovative engineering solutions for architec-
tures based on mobile multi-agent systems in an e-commerce setting. E-
commerce can be deﬁned as the sum of all activities that are directly con-
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cerned with the trade of goods and services on the Internet. It is thus part
of the more general electronic business communication of so-called e-business
activities. E-Commerce can be sub-divided into separate market segments
according to the direction of the ﬂow of trade between business areas or pro-
ducers and consumers of goods.
Implementing e-commerce applications, results in large and complex sys-
tems which cannot be developed without anticipating and targeting possible
vulnerabilities. However, to determine, analyze, and assess these vulnerabili-
ties requires a thorough knowledge of how the individual components interact
with each other. The complex and distributed nature of such systems raises
the question of how to combine security measures, targeted at security is-
sues of individual components to an overall security infrastructure. Moreover,
trustworthy systems may not presuppose that all components are trustworthy.
Vulnerabilities of particular components may be circumvented if the environ-
ment using these components takes care of their weaknesses.
In order to construct trustworthy large-scale systems in the domain of
mobile multi-agent systems, a general methodology has to map (decompose)
the notion of trustworthiness of an overall system to speciﬁc requirements,
or trustworthiness of its individual components. Rather than improving par-
ticular solutions for small-scale security problems, the problem is to ﬁnd an
appropriate decomposition of the overall system with respect to security, al-
lowing us to (re-)use existing approaches for small-scale problems. We propose
three major levels for mobile multi-agent systems: the application architec-
ture, the systems design and the computational level. In the following, we will
sketch the issues which arise at each individual level, and between successive
levels (see Figure 1).
3.0.2 Application Architecture — Secure Market Places:
The application architecture is concerned with the overall design and organi-
zation of the market place scenarios under consideration. This is done without
looking at technical solutions.
The multi-agent research at this level is concentrated on the design and
analysis of innovative models of virtual market places. Rather than coming
up with new economic models for virtual market places, the idea is to adapt
existing models to the case of multi-agent systems. From todays perspective
auction houses, virtual malls, and free markets are the basic models that form
the starting point for this thread of research. Concrete instances of these
models have to be designed and will form the basis for further investigations.
The main focus of multiagent system research at this level is to investigate
the interaction of security requirements with the general model speciﬁcation
of virtual market places.
In the corresponding phase of security engineering, potential threats are
identiﬁed and security objectives are deﬁned to counteract these threats. In a
rigorous approach both, the abstract application architecture, and the desired
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security objectives, are formalized.
At the application architecture level, we investigate on how security re-
quirements of the diﬀerent types of virtual markets can be formalized, and
later-on guaranteed (veriﬁed) depending on which security mechanisms and
protocols are provided by the underlying systems architecture level. Abstract
speciﬁcation of negotiation and interaction models are developed, according
to the underlying economic models. Furthermore, we we investigate in how
changes of these underlying economic models inﬂuence the deﬁnition and ver-
iﬁcation of security objectives.
For example, an appropriate management of trust has to be deﬁned for
each application scenario which guides the information ﬂow within the agent
society. Formal security policies constitute the technical means to formalize
such a management of trust. We will, for instance, be concerned with the de-
velopment and instantiation of non-interference policies for non-deterministic
systems to allow for the veriﬁcation (validation) of the security objectives of
the particular multi-agent systems under consideration.
3.0.3 System Architecture — Secure Agents and Agent Societies
The system architecture is concerned with the technical solution that realizes
the intended virtual market places based on a society of agents. This level is
concerned with both the extention and reﬁnement of existing multi-agent sys-
tems to suit the design of virtual market places, and the further development
of the underlying architectures for specifying individual agents.
The design of multi-agent societies have to meet the requirements of the
models speciﬁed at the application architecture level. Negotiation mechanisms
among individual agents are needed in these agent societies. According to [7]
negotiation research can be considered to deal with three broad topics: ne-
gotiation protocols, negotiation objects, and agents’ decision making models.
While it is clear that one has to deal with all three issues we want to put a
focus on negotiation protocols and decision making models.
We investigate the interaction between the architecture of a single agent
and that of the emerging multi-agent system particularly with respect to secu-
rity requirements. The question arises as to which types of secure architectures
for agent societies are possible with respect to knowledge, problem-solving,
data storage, communication, social conventions, and protocols. We aim at a
formal deﬁnition of instantiations of these architectures to allow for a gradual
veriﬁcation and evaluation. The agent architecture InteRRaP-R [9,8], which
was developed at the DFKI, is the starting point for this research. However,
it is necessary to redesign InteRRaP-R to meet the security issues of the agent
architecture. Therefore, we investigate in how far the reasoning procedures
in InteRRaP-R can be adapted to reason about basic security mechanisms
as well. Furthermore, the reasoning procedures are extended to allow meta-
reasoning to give the agent the ability to ﬁnd out whether executed actions
have the intended eﬀects.
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At the level of individual agents, security issues can be classiﬁed as: the
correct functional behavior, the secure traveling through the network, and
the secure communication with other agents. In the past, a variety of formal
methods have been developed to prove that a program (an agent) behaves ac-
cording to its (formal) speciﬁcation. To guarantee secure traveling of agents,
agents have to authorize themselves to the host. After a successful authoriza-
tion, an access policy deﬁnes the resources an agent may use on a foreign host.
The question arises how to deﬁne and implement such access policies allow-
ing, on the one hand, the agent to access all necessary data, and on the other
hand, the host to charge the authority of the agent for the used resources. If
agents are endangered when traveling on the net, the use of multiple instances
of individual agents might be an appropriate approach to provide more robust
system behavior.
Communications between agents have to be secured with the help of cryp-
tographic (security) protocols. The question arises as of how existing security
protocols can be used and how this selection will eﬀect the construction of
a secure agent architecture (or system). For instance, the threat that a host
may attack an agent results in the restriction that agents must not possess a
secret key. Therefore, agents are not able to sign documents unless they make
use of a trusted authority or migrate to a trusted host. Static information
of the agent may be used to formulate the digital signature. In this context,
the possibility of splitting information across diﬀerent agents [15] might be an
interesting concept which could lead to innovative solutions.
At the level of agent societies the question arises as to what kind of ar-
chitectures and implementations of secure agents and mobile multi-agent sys-
tems are compatible with the security requirements at the application level.
Which types of secure agents are compatible with which types of secure market
places, and how, and in what way, this compatibility is gradually veriﬁable,
or amenable to evaluation? Conversely, the following question arises: what
are the provable eﬀects in the theory and implementation of which kinds of
security mechanisms at the level of the agent – and a correspondingly secure,
generic architecture of an agent (or an agent system) on the economic model
of the respective market places? For example, could the restrictions obtained
this way maintain theoretical convergence?
It is well know from other applications that the relation between the appli-
cation architecture and the abstract system design is not a simple reﬁnement.
For example, in order to use encryption, complex (cryptographic) protocols
for the exchange of keys have to be introduced that require an analysis of their
own. The management of certiﬁcates raises new integrity problems. Basically,
the whole analysis has to be redone at a new level. The situation is even
worse if mobile agents are considered. Implicit assumptions, like the integrity
of customers themselves, require complex mechanisms if these are realized by
agents that migrate to possible hostile computation platforms.
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3.0.4 Computational Architecture
The implementation architecture is concerned with the provision of a secure
environment for distributed computation. Security requirements at this level
are concerned, for instance, with threats that an agent attacks a host or that a
host accesses an agent’s secrets. Threats to a host may endanger the integrity
of a host. While proper access control mechanisms (like Java Virtual Machine,
JVM) can be used to ensure that agents do not change the intentional behavior
of the hosts, it is still an open problem how to prevent a host from attacking
an agent. In principle, an agent cannot verify the correct execution of its code.
For example, a host may either alter, read, or delete conﬁdential infor-
mation of the agent or it may slow down or even refuse the execution of an
agent’s program. Methods are needed to protect conﬁdential information of an
individual agent when resident on a host as well as when migrating from one
host to another. The agent information can be divided into diﬀerent types.
The agent’s program code and other static information can be protected
by digitally signing it, thus after-the-fact detection of tampering is possible.
However, it is impossible to prevent agent tampering unless trusted hardware
is available at the foreign host. Since the agent’s code has to run on a foreign
host, it is also impossible to keep its code private. In order to keep its code
secret, an agent has to resort to using a trusted host.
Since an agent’s foremost task is to gather information, the privacy of this
information is usually of greater concern than the privacy of the agent’s code.
There are two modes of information gathering [2]. In a stateless mode, an
agent sends the collected information home to its authority. Thus, the foreign
host providing the information can also be used to take care of encryption and
of the delivery of the information to the authority. In a stateful mode, the
gained information is in some way attached to the agent and it carries it along
its way when migrating from one host to another. Again the host providing
the information may encrypt the data with the help of the public key of the
agents authority preventing the disclosure of the information to other hosts.
However, in order to make conﬁdential use of the collected data during its
itinerary, the agent has again to resort to a trusted (e.g. tamper-resistant)
host. Thus, the agent’s itinerary will be inﬂuenced by security aspects. An
agent has to deliberately migrate to trusted hardware in order to process its
collected data.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we descirbed a generic methodology to validate, assess, and con-
struct mobile mult-agent systems in the domain of virtual marketplaces. This
methodology distinguishes three levels of abstraction on which design and se-
curity aspects can be investigated: the application architecture, the system
architecture, and the computational architecture. The main contribution of
this article and the work done so far was to specify this general framework.
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As it was outlined in the paper there are results to deal with speciﬁc security
problems in each of the abstraction levels. The main aim of our future work
is therefore to investigate an integrative model which can deal with the inter-
action of security mechanisms that are speciﬁed and implemented at diﬀerent
levels.
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